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The

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Truck

Insurance

Exchange

("TIE"), through its attorneys of record, respectfully submits this
brief opposing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the
Defendant/Petitioner, Motor Cargo ("Motor Cargo").
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The questions presented for review are as stated by Motor
Cargo in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the "Petition").
OPINION ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS
On July 30, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its
decision affirming the judgment of the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, State of Utah, in favor of TIE and against
Motor Cargo.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
TIE adopts the Statement of Jurisdiction as set forth in
Motor Cargo's Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TIE adopts the statement of the case as set forth in
Motor Cargo's Petition with the following additions:
On February 25, 1987, the trial court entered an Order
and Judgment1 in which it:

(a)

granted TIE'S Motion for Summary

Judgment on its First Cause of Action;

(b)

denied TIE'S Motion

for Summary Judgment on its Second Cause of Action;

(c)

denied

Motor Cargo's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim;
1

A copy of the Order and Judgment is included in the
Appendix to this Brief as "Part B."
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(d)

granted Motor Cargo leave to amend its Counterclaim to add

claims for trade libel and interference with contract and business
advantage;

(e)

granted TIE'S Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

William K. Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, the only affidavit filed by
Motor Cargo in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, as to
those provisions of Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 thereof which contain
hearsay and opinions of William K. Maxwell and James Keddington;
and

(f)

stayed execution on the Judgment until all remaining

claims asserted by the parties were adjudicated.

(Emphasis added)

Thereafter, in accordance with the parties' Stipulation2
dated December 16, 1987, the issues not resolved by the Order and
Judgment were submitted to the court for trial pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure based upon the pleadings, stipulated

facts, motions,

affidavits and memoranda of the parties, excepting Motor Cargo's
claims in its Amended Counterclaim for trade libel and interference
with contract and business advantage which were severed for trial
at a later date.

Following the trial court's issuance of its

Memorandum Decision granting judgment in favor of TIE, TIE served
interrogatories

and

requests

for

admissions

on

Motor

Cargo

regarding its trade libel and contract interference
2

This Stipulation, as noted in Motor Cargo's Petition on
page 9, for unknown reasons, is not part of the record below. It
is referred to in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. A copy of
the Stipulation, without the exhibits, was included in the Addendum
to TIE'S Brief filed with the Utah Court of Appeals and is also
included in the Appendix to this Brief as "Part E."
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claims. Shortly thereafter, Motor Cargo proposed that those claims
be dismissed and an Order of Dismissal was entered based upon the
parties' stipulation. The trial court then entered its Findings of
Fact,

Conclusions of Law and the final Judgment appealed from by

Motor Cargo.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TIE adopts Motor Cargo's Statement of Facts with the
following additions, modifications and objections:
A.

ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS:
1.

TIE

and

Motor

Cargo

entered

into

preliminary

discussions and negotiations regarding the Retrospective Premium
Determination Agreement-Plan III ("Retro Agreement") during which
TIE'S representative explained its contents, and in particular, how
the cancellation provisions of Paragraph 16 would be applied.

(R.

229-230)
2.

Before the Retro Agreement was

signed by Motor

Cargo's representative, TIE'S representative specifically explained
to him that retrospective rating was a method of determining, in
retrospect,

what

the

final

earned

premium

for the

policy of

insurance would be for the agreed three-year term; that all interim
refunds and premium adjustments were subject to a final adjustment
and settlement at the end of the three-year term; and that if the
Retro

Agreement

were

terminated

early

the

provisions

of

Paragraph 16 would apply and Motor Cargo would lose the benefits of
retrospective rating.

(R. 229-230)
3
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3.

Retrospective rating is designed to provide benefits

and potential savings to an insured with a good loss experience
record over the agreed three-year term of the Retro Agreement. (R.
224-25, 336, 391)
4.

Premiums determined by using retrospective rating

under a Retro Agreement benefit the insured by providing the option
of partial self insurance and broader insurance coverage at a
substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar
coverage under a standard one-year policy.
5.

Motor Cargo cancelled Retro Agreement B at the end

of the first year of the three-year term.
6.
cancellation

Id.

(R. 15, 392)

Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B3 provides for
by

either

party,

and

with

respect

to

early

cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, provides, in part:
CANCELLATION. This agreement may be cancelled
by the Insured, or by the Exchange, at any
time, by giving thirty days (30) advance
written notice to the other party. . . . The
premium for a cancellation prior to the end of
the term of this agreement shall be computed
in accordance with the other provisions of
this agreement, subject to the following
additional provisions.
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured:
In the event of cancellation by the named
insured for any other reason, the minimum
earned premium shall be 110% of the
Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is
the greater, but the amount so calculated
3

A copy of Retro Agreement B is included in the Appendix
to this Brief as "Part F."
tie\mc-brief
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shall not exceed the Standard Premium as
defined in this agreement; provided, however,
that if the insured orders cancellation of
this agreement within sixty days following the
effective date of any rate increase in any of
the policies of insurance applicable to this
agreement,
or
the
business
entity
is
dissolved, the earned premium shall be the
Retrospective Premium.

(R. 14)
7.

Following the cancellation of Retro Agreement B by

Motor Cargo and after making the various accounting adjustments
specified therein and issuing interim reports, TIE sent Motor Cargo
its final invoice dated March 31, 1986, showing a premium due of
$68,394.00, which reflects all premium adjustments and credits and
supersedes all interim adjustments and reports made under Retro
Agreement B.
8.

(R. 153, 392-93)
For purposes of this Court's consideration of Motor

Cargo's Petition, the following Findings of Fact are material, in
addition to those identified

in Paragraph 22 of Motor Cargo's

Statement of Facts:

8.
The Retro Agreements and the Policy are
somewhat unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a
much broader insurance coverage at substantial
savings over a standard or fixed-rate policy
conditional upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the
extent to which Motor Cargo is determined to be
self insuring.
9.
Retrospective rating under the Retro
Agreements provides a method of determining, in

tie\mc-brief
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retrospect, what the final earned premium for the
Policy will be for the agreed term of the Policy.

12. The benefits and potential savings to the
insured are dependent upon the insured's loss
experience over the agreed term, as retrospective
rating is designed to recognize the merits of each
individual risk based upon the loss experience of
the insured. . . . (emphasis added)
13. A substantial part of the consideration
to TIE in entering into the Retro Agreements with
Motor Cargo was the agreement of Motor Cargo to
continue insurance coverage in force for the
specified term of three (3) years rather than the
one-year term of a standard policy. (R. 390-391)
B.

OBJECTIONS:
TIE objects to Paragraph 11 of Motor Cargo's Statement of

Facts and asserts that the following statements accurately reflect
the facts shown in the Record below.4:
9.

William K. Maxwell (Maxwell) never was an agent of

TIE at any time prior to Motor Cargo's cancellation of Retro
Agreement B, as Retro Agreement B was cancelled effective February
28, 1983, and Maxwell first became an agent for TIE in December,
1984, 22 months later.
10.

(R. 175, 392; Appendix - Part I)

Maxwell's discussions with an officer of Motor Cargo

regarding Maxwell's opinion of the consequences to Motor Cargo of
4

Paragraph 11 of Motor Cargo's Statement of Facts is
highly misleading as it erroneously states or implies that William
K. Maxwell was a former insurance agent of TIE when he met with
Motor Cargo's officer to discuss the early cancellation provisions
and that this discussion occurred before Motor Cargo signed Retro
Agreement B. This matter is referred to in additional detail on
pages 11 through 13 of this brief.
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early cancellation did not occur until February, 1983, the first
time Maxwell had thoroughly reviewed and studied a Retro Agreement,
and eleven months after Retro Agreement B had been signed,

(R.

216; Appendix - Part I)
11.

In February, 1983, Maxwell was employed by Transport

Insurance, a competitor of TIE, who was attempting to get the
insurance business of Motor Cargo that was then being handled by
TIE.

(Id.) (All emphasis added)
ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE
CONSTRUCTION IN INTERPRETING RETRO AGREEMENT B.
A,

RULES

OF

The doctrine of strict construction of an insurance
policy against the drafter does not apply in this
case.
Motor Cargo erroneously contends that because the Court

of Appeals determined an ambiguity exists in Retro Agreement B, it
failed to construe that ambiguity against TIE. While application
of the doctrine of strict construction of an insurance policy
against its drafter is appropriate under certain circumstances, the
facts do not warrant its application in this case. The cases cited
in Motor Cargo's Petition, LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance
Company, 765 P.2d

857, 858-59. (Utah 1988) and Metropolitan

Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, (Utah App. 1988),5

5

The Utah Court of Appeals later vacated its opinion in
this case. See Metropolitan Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 766
P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989).
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involve facts and issues significantly different from those of this
case. LPS Hospital involves the resolution of an ambiguity in the
coverage provisions

of

an insurance policy

purchased

by an

individual and holds that any ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language of an insurance policy is to be resolved in favor of
coverage and against the drafter of the policy in order to afford
the insured the protection he or she sought to obtain by paying
premiums.
Retro Agreement B is not a "policy of insurance" in the
context of LPS Hospital or other similar cases applying the rule of
strict construction urged by Motor Cargo. That is, it is not the
instrument whereby one contractor transfers a risk to another
contractor who agrees to assume the risk for a consideration. See
Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 1:1-4 (1959).

Rather, Retro Agreement B

is a separate agreement, the sole purpose of which is to provide
the method of determining the premium to be paid.

It contains no

provisions relating to coverage. To refer to Retro Agreement B as
an "insurance contract" as Motor Cargo has done in its Petition is
erroneous.
The doctrine of strict construction of insurance policies
against the insurer recognizes that parties to routine kinds of
insurance policies ordinarily do not discuss or negotiate their
terms and provisions, and that parties to insurance contracts
usually have disparate bargaining positions. These factors are not
present here. Retro Agreement B is an agreement between two large
p
tie\mc-brief
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commercial

entities

and

the

undisputed

facts

show

that

representatives of Motor Cargo and TIE entered into preliminary
discussions and negotiations before Retro Agreement B was executed.
In his affidavit,6 Wendell Wells, TIE'S representative in those
discussions and negotiations states, in part:

4. On behalf of TIE, I entered into
preliminary discussions with representatives
of Motor Cargo regarding the execution of the
Retro Agreement. I explained the contents of
the Retro Agreement to the defendant's
representatives and in particular how the
cancellation provisions of the Retro Agreement
in Paragraph 16 would be applied.

6.
Before the Retro Agreement was
executed by Motor Cargo, I explained to Mr.
Ranck, [Motor Cargo's President], among other
things, that retrospective rating was a method
of determining, in retrospect, what the final
earned premium for a policy of insurance would
be for the agreed three-year term of the
policy, and that all interim refunds and
premium adjustments were subject to a final
adjustment and settlement at the end of the
agreed three-year term of the Retro Agreement.
I also explained to them that if the
agreements were terminated by Motor Cargo
before the end of the three-year term, that
the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Retro
Agreement would apply and that the premium
then due would be the greater of the
retrospective or basic premium computed under
the terms of the policy plus a ten percent
(10%) short-range cancellation charge, and
that Motor Cargo would lose the benefits of
6

A copy of Wendell Wells' affidavit (without exhibits) is
included in the Appendix to this Brief as "Part G." Motor Cargo
filed no affidavit opposing or refuting Wendell Wells' Affidavit.
tie\mc-brief
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retrospective rating,
added)

(R. 229-230) (Emphasis

In any event, the doctrine of strict construction is not
a trump card that may be played at any time an ambiguity in a
contract exists.
resort.

In

Rather, it is applied by the courts as a last

Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585

(Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals explains the proper
application of this rule:
Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that
contracts should be construed against the
drafter.
[footnote omitted]
The doctrine
does not operate in dispositive fashion simply
because ambiguity has been found.
Once a
contract is deemed ambiguous, the next order
of business is to admit extrinsic evidence to
aid in the interpretation of the contract. It
is only after extrinsic evidence is considered
and the Court is still uncertain as to the
intention of the parties that ambiguities
should be construed against the drafter,
[footnote omitted] (Emphasis added)
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals acknowledges that insurance
contracts could be an exception to the above rule, but explains
this result as stemming from the fact that insurance contracts are
ordinarily not preceded by discussions of specific terms or by
negotiations.
B.

Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret Retro
Agreement B is Proper
As stated in Wilburn. supra, when

a court determines

that a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence regarding the
intentions of the parties should be received and considered as the
next step to aid in the interpretation of the contract.
tie\mc-brief
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See also

Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1989) and Kimball v.
Campbell. 699 P.2d
Insurance

Exchange,

714, 716
657

P.2d

(Utah 1985)1358,

1359

In Hibdon v. Truck
(Utah

1983),

a case

involving the interpretation of an insurance binder, this Court
observed that if ambiguity had been found in the language of the
insurance binder, the "ambiguity would permit parol evidence to be
admitted as to the intentions of the parties in using the language
which they employed" and cites several other cases in which other
courts have affirmed the use of extrinsic evidence in interpreting
ambiguous terms of insurance contracts.

See also Garcia v. Truck

Insurance Exchange, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Cal. 1984).

Thus, the

Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not
err in admitting extrinsic evidence in this case and that its
finding of fact under the standard of review in Kimball, supra,
should not be disturbed.
II-

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ADMISSIBLE
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE PARTIES DISCUSSED THE
PROVISIONS OF RETRO AGREEMENT B AND THAT MOTOR CARGO KNEW THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ITS EARLY CANCELLATION.
It is significant that Motor Cargo not only offered no

affidavit in opposition to the affidavit of Wendell Wells referred
to on pages 9 and 10 of this Brief, but offered no extrinsic
evidence of its contractual intent.

tie\mc-brief
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The sole affidavit submitted

by it was that of William K. Maxwell (the "Maxwell Affidavit").7
Based

upon

TIE'S

Motion

to

Strike,

the

trial

court

ordered

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Maxwell Affidavit stricken to the
extent they contain hearsay and the opinions of Maxwell and of a
James Keddington,
Cargo.8

This order has never been challenged by Motor

The remaining relevant portions of the Maxwell Affidavit

are refuted or discredited by Maxwell's own supplemental affidavit
filed

at

a

later

date

(the

"Supplemental

Affidavit").9

Nevertheless, Motor Cargo persists here, as it did before the Court
of Appeals, in its efforts to resurrect the stricken paragraphs of
the

Maxwell

Affidavit,

apparently

failing

to

recognize

or

acknowledge that the affidavit provides Motor Cargo with no help on
the issue of the parties' contractual intentions.

The Maxwell

Affidavit relates to Maxwell's opinion regarding his interpretation
of the Retro Agreement reached after the agreement was signed and
does not purport to relate to Motor Cargo's contractual intent.
Therefore, even were they admissible, the opinions of Maxwell and
Keddington

regarding

their

interpretation

of

the

cancellation

provisions of Retro Agreement B are simply not relevant or material
to

Motor

Cargo's

contractual

intent.

7

A copy of the Maxwell Affidavit
Appendix to this Brief as "Part H."

In

his

Supplemental

is included

in the

8

See Paragraph 4 of the Order and Judgment included as
"Part B" of the Appendix to this Brief.
9

A copy of Maxwell's Supplemental Affidavit is included as
"Part I" of the Appendix to this Brief.
12
tie\mc-brief

x

*

Affidavit, Maxwell admits that he first examined Retro Agreement B
and formulated his opinion in February, 1983, approximately twelve
months after the agreement was signed.

He also admits that he

was then employed by a competitor of TIE who was seeking to get
Motor Cargo's insurance business.

These admissions provided the

trial court with ample reason to disregard his original affidavit
in its entirety.10
Motor Cargo's argument that the evidence does not show it
knew it would lose "excess" premium payments in the event of early
cancellation is specious and should be rejected by this Court. It
was apparent to the trial court, and the Court of Appeals, as it
should

be

to

Motor

Cargo's

counsel,

that

the

benefit

of

retrospective rating is the potential of achieving lower premiums
based upon an insured's loss experience.

This was the obvious

benefit sought by Motor Cargo in entering into Retro Agreement B.
So-called "excess premiums" cannot exist unless the retrospective
rating formula, applied to the insured's loss experience, results
in a premium which is lower than the basic monthly premium paid, as
specified in the Retro Agreement.

10

Thus, contrary to Motor Cargo's

The Maxwell Affidavit is fatally defective for the
additional reason that it fails to state that it is based upon
Maxwell's personal knowledge and information.
Treloggan v.
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).
tie\mc-brief
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assertion,

the

loss

of

the

benefit

of

retrospective

rating

necessarily equates with the loss of any excess premium.11
The extrinsic

evidence and the reasonable

inferences

which may be drawn therefrom provide a sufficient basis for the
trial court's finding that before the parties entered into Retro
Agreement B, TIE specifically explained the cancellation provisions
of Paragraph

16 to Motor

Cargo,

including

the

fact

that

the

benefits of retrospective rating would be lost if Motor Cargo
cancelled early.

This evidence also provides a sufficient basis

for the inference and conclusion that Motor Cargo knew any excess
premiums would be lost.
based upon the unopposed

Because the trial court's findings are
and unrefuted

affidavit

submitted by

TIE,12 there is no basis in the record for the Court of Appeals to
have made a determination that the findings were clearly erroneous.
Motor Cargo did not

and, indeed, cannot

demonstrate that

the

evidence is legally insufficient to support those findings and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

See Reid v. Mutual of

Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 897. Significantly, Motor Cargo
offered no evidence in support of its contention that it did not
know

or

understand

the

consequences

of

early

cancellation.

11

Without retrospective rating, there simply would be no
method of calculating whether an excess premium exists in the
contxt of Paragraph 13 of the Retro Agreeemnt, the paragraph relied
upon by Motor Cargo. Obviously, if the calculation cannot be made,
the refund provisions of that paragraph cannot be implemented.
12

See Affidavit of Wendell Wells, Appendix, "Part G" and
footnote 6 on page 8 of this Brief.
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cancellation.

Moreover, Motor Cargo failed to object to the entry

of the trial court's findings on that issue and failed to move to
amend or make additional findings. In view of the foregoing, Motor
Cargo is precluded at this stage of the proceedings from attacking
the

sufficiency

findings.

of the evidence

supporting

the trial

court's

Fitzgerald v. Corbet. supra.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals followed and applied well accepted

and established principles of law in affirming the judgment of the
trial court.

Motor Cargo has failed to demonstrate that any

special or important reason exists, within the meaning of Rule 46
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, why this Court should
grant a writ of certiorari.

TIE, therefore, respectfully requests

that Motor Cargo's Petition be denied.
DATED this

tf^

day of October, 1990
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Harold C. Verhaaren
Mark F. Bell
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 4^4-6161

)LD C. VERHAAREN
Attorneys for Respondent

tie\mc-brief
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this

5 ^ * day of October, 1990, four

copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent Opposing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari were sent by first-class mail with postage
thereon fully prepaid to:
Giaugue, Crockett & Bindings
Jay D. Gurmankin
Mark Y, Hirata
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Truck Insurance Exchange, a
corporation,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890180-CA

v.
Motor Cargo, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

FILED
JUL 30J290

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys: Jay D. Gurmankin, Mark Y. Hirata, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Harold C. Verhaaren, Mark F. Bell, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Greenwood.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) filed a complaint
against Appellant Motor Cargo for breach of an insurance policy
and a retrospective premium determination agreement. The trial
court found that Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance
coverage in the principal sum of $68,394, plus accruing
interest. We affirm.
This controversy focuses on a three-year retrospective
premium determination agreement entered into by the parties.
Motor Cargo, which exercised its right to terminate the agreement
after one year, claims that it is only subject under the
agreement to a ten percent cancellation penalty. Under a
different interpretation, TIE claims that Motor Cargo is liable
for a ten percent penalty in the amount of $13,960 and that this
penalty prevents Motor Cargo from recovering $56,931 in
retrospective excess premiums, resulting in an actual total
penalty of fifty-one percent.

APPENDIX - Part A

Two of the agreement's pertinent provisions directly
conflict with one another. Paragraph 13 provides for the refund
of excess retrospective premiums, following the computation of
the retrospective premiums at specified time intervals.
Paragraph 16, on the other hand, provides that "[t]he premium for
a cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agreement
shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of this
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions."
(Emphasis added.) The operative additional provision in
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of
the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as
defined in this agreement. . . .M The trial court determined
that since the basic premium was higher than the retrospective
premium, Motor Cargo was not entitled to the excess premiums.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[i]n contract
actions, we defer to the trial judge on issues of fact, but not
on issues of law." 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). The supreme
court's standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a
contract is that:
A contract's interpretation may be
either a question of law, determined by
the words of the agreement, or a question
of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence
of intent. If a trial court interprets a
contract as a matter of law, we accord its
construction no particular weight,
reviewing its action under a correctness
standard. However, if the contract is not
an integration or is ambiguous and the
trial court proceeds to find facts
respecting the intentions of the parties
based on extrinsic evidence, then our
review is strictly limited.
Id. (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)).
This court has stated that H[i]n the first instance, the
determination of whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law.- Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v, Reichert, 784
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Where questions arise in
the interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is
within the document itself. It should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
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We disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that the
contract in this case is unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges
the refund provision of Paragraph 13, while at the same-time
imposing a penalty that arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A
plain reading of the contract does not indicate whether Min
accordance with" Paragraph 13 controls over the contract being
"subject to* the additional provisions of Paragraph 16. Nor does
a plain reading lead to the sure conclusion that Motor Cargo
would give up the premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than
being subject to the more customary trade penalty of ten percent.
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to construe an -ambiguous
contract. See 50 W. Broadway A s s o c . 784 P.2d at 1 171? Kimball,
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity require s extrinsic
evidence in order for the contract to be properly i nterpreted.
The court received such extrinsic evidence and refe rs to it in
the findings. Such evidence showed that the partie s discussed
the provisions at issue prior to entering into th£ agreement and
that they knew the excess premium refund would b& 1 ost in the
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore hold that the
trial court correctly admitted extrinsic evidenced n this case
and, under the standard set forth in Kimball,1 well eave the
court's findings of fact undisturbed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

CONCUR:

Juditljjfl. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. M[I]f the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and
the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions
of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then our review is
strictly limited." Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

Defendant.

)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
vs.
Civil No. 34602

The parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the
motion of the plaintiff to strike the affidavit of William K.
Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, filed in support of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the defendant's
motion to amend its counterclaim came on regularly for hearing
on Tuesday, December 2, 1986, at the hour of 11:00 a.m. before
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of the judges in the
above-entitled Court. Harold C. Verhaaren of Larsen, Mazuran &
Verhaaren appeared for the plaintiff.

Jay D. Gurmankin of

Giauque & Williams appeared for the defendant.

The Court,

having considered the argument of counsel, the memoranda of
points and authorities on file herein and the affidavits

jDDBMEHT EHTBB
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supporting said motions, and being fully advised in the
premises, herewith
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

The plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to

the First Cause of Action of its complaint is granted, and the
plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant on that
cause of action in the sum of $70,964.00, plus interest thereon
commencing as of the entry of this Order; the amount of such
interest, however, shall not be determined until the
defendant's Amended Counterclaim is adjudicated, and, at such
time, the interest on the plaintiffs First Cause of Action
shall be computed by multiplying the legal rate of 10 percent
(10%) per annum times the amount by which $70,964,00 exceeds
the amount of the defendant's recovery on its Amended
Counterclaim or set-off by way of defenses, if any.

Execution

shall not issue hereon until the claims contained in the
plaintiff's Second Cause of Action and the defendant's Answer
and Amended Counterclaim are adjudicated by the Court.

The

amount of attorney's fees, if any, to be awarded is also
reserved until that time.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with

respect to its Second Cause of Action is denied.
3.

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is

4.

The plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

denied.

William K. Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, is granted as to those
portions of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of said affidavit which
-23042w

contain henjfsay and the opinions of William K. Maxwell and
James Reddington*
5.

The defendant may amend its Counterclaim to

assert additional claims for intentional interference with the
defendant's business relationships only.

The defendant is

ordered to file its Amended Counterclaim within ten (10) days
following the date of the entry of this Order, and the
plaintiff shall file its response to the Amended Counterclaim
within ten (10) days after the Amended Counterclaim is filed
and served upon the plaintiff's attorneys of record.
DATED this

A S ^ d a y of February, 1987.
BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN

^Farola c. Verhaaren
Attorneys for Plaintiff
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BENDINGER

By

LA^irJilLUJLL

Jay D. Gdrmankin

Christopher M. Mislow
Attorneys for Defendant
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326
MARK P. BELL - 4536
MAZURAB, VERHAAREH & HAYES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkview Plata, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 Bast
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6161
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND POR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—-

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
a corporation,

»
t

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

t

Civil No. 34602

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

Plaintiff,
vs
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

t

Defendant.

000O000

All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987,
excepting

those

claims

asserted

in the defendant's

Amended

Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16,
1987, (the "Stipulation"), and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda
submitted in support of their respective positions.

The Court

FILMED
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thereafter entered its written Memorandum Decision dated May 20,
1988, its written Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its
oral ruling on January 3, 1989.

Further, in accordance with the

parties' Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the
Court entered its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the
defendant's Amended Counterclaim.

The Court, now being fully

advised in the premises, herewith enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") at

all times material to its Complaint in this matter was duly
licensed to conduct the business of an insurer in the State of
Utah.
2.

The defendant Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation

("Motor Cargo-) at all times material to TIE'S Complaint
maintained its principal place of business in North Salt Lake,
Davis County, State of Utah.
3.

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the

terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979,
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement—Plan IIIM (MRetro Agreement—A"), TIE issued its
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor Cargo
having an effective date of March 1, 1979. A copy of Retro
Agreement—A is attached to the parties' Stipulation as
Exhibit "0."
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4.

From March 1# 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of the

Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage
to Motor Cargo*
5.

At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy was

renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1,
1982,

and

a

second

Retrospective

Premium

Determination

Agreement—Plan III (-Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached to the parties'
Stipulation as Exhibit "P."
6.

The second agreement, Retro Agreement—B# signed

March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement—A except for
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro
Agreement—B.
7.

The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic

premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a monthly basis,
but which allow adjustments to that premium by way of additional
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for
any excess payments,
8.

The Retro Agreements and the Policy are somewhat

unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a much broader insurance
coverage at substantial savings over a standard or fixed-rate
policy conditioned upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the extent
to which Motor Cargo is determined to be self insuring.
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9.

Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements

provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the
Policy.
10.

Under retrospective rating, the final earned premium

is determined by considering a number of factors, including the
amount of

losses an insured

sustains, administrative costs,

expenses for adjusting claims, and applicable premium taxes in
accordance with the agreed formula.
11.

Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner

set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits an insured by allowing
it the option of partial self-insurance, and because of the
retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance coverage
at a substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar
coverage under a standard policy.
12.

The benefits and potential savings to the insured

are dependent upon the insured's loss experience over the agreed
term, as retrospective rating is designed to recognize the merits
of each individual risk based upon the loss experience of the
insured. Each insured develops its own record with respect to the
premium to be paid at the end of the agreed term.
13.

A substantial part of the consideration to TIE in

entering into the Retro Agreements with Motor Cargo was the
agreement of Motor Cargo to continue insurance coverage in force
for the specified term of three (3) years rather than the one-year
terra of a standard policy.
4

14.

Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreements provides for

cancellation by either party upon thirty (30) days written notice
and that the premium upon cancellation prior to the end of the
three-year term would be computed in accordance with other terms
of

the

agreement,

subject

to

certain

additional

provisions

depending upon whether the insured, Motor Cargo, or the insurer,
TIE, cancelled.
15.

Paragraph 16 also provides, among other things, that

if the insured, Motor Cargo, cancelled the Policy, that the minimum
earned premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or of the
Basic Premium, whichever was greater.
16.

The

cancellation

provision

was

specifically

explained to an officer of Motor Cargo when the Retro Agreement was
entered into, that is, that in the event of cancellation of the
Policy before the three (3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose
the benefits of retrospective rating.
17.

In a written notice dated February 28, 1983, Motor

Cargo properly gave notice to TIE to cancel all insurance policies
then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, including the Policy.
18.

In accordance with that notice, TIE cancelled the

Policy as of February 28, 1983.
19.

In accordance with the provisions

of

the Retro

Agreements, following the cancellation of the Policy, and after
making various accounting adjustments, TIE sent Motor Cargo its
final invoice showing a premium due of $68,394.00, which included
a sum equal to 110% of the greater of the Basic Premium or the

5

Retrospective Premium due on Retro Agreement—B, but which gave
Motor Cargo no credit for any excess premium which it claims was
due it.
20.

Motor

Cargo

is

indebted

to

TIE

for

insurance

coverage provided under the Policy and the Retro Agreements in the
principal sum of $68,394.00, plus accruing interest.
21.

Motor Cargo is entitled to the award of reasonable

attorney's fees.
22.

While

all

time

claimed

by

TIE'S

attorney

was

actually spent in prosecuting TIE'S claims against Motor Cargo, the
rate charged was reasonable# and the issues, though limited, were
complex and difficult, some items could have been handled by an
associate in TIE'S law firm or by a clerk at a lesser hourly rate,
even though that decision was ultimately for TIE'S counsel to make
and even though the Court, were he a practicing attorney, would
personally

feel

more

comfortable

handling

those

items.

Accordingly, the attorney's fee requested by TIE'S attorney should
be reduced to $14,500, a reasonable fee under the circumstances.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
herewith enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In the first instance, the Court is required to look

to the terms of the contract and their plain meaning on questions
of interpretation.

Only when the Court finds the contract to be

ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the general rules of
construction, i.e. favoring specific provisions over general,
6

first dated provisions over later, and construction against the
scrivener.
2.
March

1,

The Retro Agreements entered into by the parties on

1979 and on March 1, 1982, are identical with the

exception of some percentage changes in the definition paragraph
of the agreement entered into on March 1, 1982.
3.

The definition portion of the Retro Agreements

defines the terms "Basic Premium" and "Retrospective Premium."
4. Paragraph 4(b) of Retro Agreement—B (the "Agreement")
defines the basic premium as being 76.42% of the Standard Premium.
Paragraph

4(a) defines the

"Standard

Premium"

as the premium

established in the Policy.
5. Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement defines "Retrospective
Premium" as:
"The earned premium according to this agreement,
computed as the sum of Incurred Losses, plus Service
Fee# plus Premium Taxes, in no event to exceed the
Standard Premium."
6.

Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically provides

how the Retrospective Premium is to be computed.
7.

Paragraph

13

of

the

Agreement

provides

for

adjustments to the premium for any excess premium under certain
circumstances•
8.

Paragraph 16 of the Agreement provides, among other

things, that either party may cancel on thirty (30) days written
notice and that the premium for cancellation prior to the end of
the term shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions
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of the Agreement, subject to the additional provisions in Paragraph
16.
9.

One of the additional provisions of Paragraph 16

provides, in part, that if the insured cancels, the minimum
earned premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater.
10.

The Agreement specifically defines Basic Premium

and Retrospective Premium and the sianner of their calculation. Any
adjustments thereto provided in the Agreement are not included in
the definition of those terms nor in their calculation.
11.

Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner of

calculation in the Agreement subject to the provisions of
subparagraph 16(a) which specifically establishes the minimum
earned premium upon cancellation at 110% of the Retrospective
Premium or Basic Premium, whichever is greater.

This paragraph

makes no mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor
that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted.
12.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that

the Agreement under its terms is clear and unambiguous and that the
earned premium on cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is
equal to 110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium,
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Paragraphs 4,
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph 16 of
the Agreement.
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13. The Basic Premium at the time of the cancellation
was $139,600.00 and the Retrospective Premium at that time was
$82,669.00.
14. Motor Cargo has paid no excess premiums, and thus
is entitled to no credit for excess premiums as it contends.
15. TIE is entitled to judgment on its Second Cause of
Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of $13,960.00, i.e. 10% of
the Basic Premium of $139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due
the defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the difference
between those sums, namely $2,570.00 to be allowed as a credit
against the principal amount of $70,964.00 awarded against Motor
Cargo in the Summary Judgment dated February 25, 1987, on TIE'S
First Cause of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of $68,394.00.
16. Because Motor Cargo's Amended Counterclaim has been
dismissed and it is entitled to recover nothing thereby or by way
of setoff or defenses in accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of 10% per annum from
February 25, 1988r until judgment is entered based upon the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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17.

In addition, and as part of the judgment, Motor

Cargo should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees amounting to
$14,500.00 and its costs incurred herein amounting to $60.00*
LET JUDGMEKT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this _£__ day of ~ ^ k .

1989.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was caused to be served upon:
Jay D. Gurmankin
Giague & Williams
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
by hand-delivery this

V^

day of January, 1989.
fr^i
^
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326
MARK F. BELL - 4536
KAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HATES, P-C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6161
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
a corporation,

:
i

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
:

vs.
:

Civil No. 34602

MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

:
oooOooo

All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987,
excepting

those

claims

asserted

in

the

defendant's

Amended

Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16,
1987, and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda submitted in support
of their respective positions.

The Court thereafter entered its

JU06MENT ENTERED
BY „,, *MP) v *
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written

Memorandum

Decision

dated

May

20,

1988,

its vrritten

Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its oral ruling on
January

3,

1989•

Further,

in

accordance

with

the

parties'

Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the Court entered
its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the defendant's
Amended Counterclaim,

The Court, having also made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, herewith
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the plaintiff do have
and recover judgment against the defendant on the First and Second
Causes of Action of the plaintiff's Complaint in the principal sum
of

Sixty-eight

Thousand

Three

Hundred

Ninety-four

Dollars

($68,394.00), accruing interest on that sum at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum or $18.74 per day from February 25, 1988,
until the date hereof, a reasonable attorney's fee of Fourteen
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00), and costs of $60.00,
together with interest on the total judgment at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date hereof until paid in full.
This Judgment supersedes the Order and Judgment of the
Court dated February 5, 1987.
DATED this

l3^day of

UJo .

1989.

BY THE COURT:

HOHORABLfi RODNEY S4

District/Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

GURMANKIN
Attorney for Defendant
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CEmriCATg Of SBRVICg
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN k HATES, P.C., Parkview
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Judgment was caused to be
served upon:
Jay D- Gurmankin
Giaque 6 Williams
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
by first-class mail on this 2-

day of February, 1989.

tie.m-order
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GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX
Si BENDINGER
Jay D. Gurmankin
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

v*
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. 34602

Defendant.

The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), by
and through its attorneys of record, Mazuran, Verhaaren &
Hayes, P.C., and the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation
(-Motor Cargo"), by and through its attorneys of record,
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger, herewith stipulate and
agree as follows:
1.

The issues in this proceeding not heretofore

resolved by the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February
25, 1987, other than Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and
interference with contract and business advantage, are herewith

APPENDIX - Part E

submitted to the Court for trial and judgment pursuant to Rules
39(b) and 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon the
Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits supporting and opposing
summary judgment previously submitted, and upon the facts
stipulated below.

For the Courtfs convenience, said Motions,

Memoranda and Affidavits, and the Judgment and Order of the
Court, are attached hereto and incorporated herein as

Exhibits

-A" through "N".
2.

Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and

interference with contract and business advantages are severed
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and trial on
those claims is hereby deferred to a date to be set in the
future.
3«

The following facts are stipulated for the

purposes of trial and the Court is to determine the other facts
based on the memoranda, affidavits and exhibits previously
referred to:
(a)

TIE is and at all times material to its

Complaint in this matter was duly licensed to conduct the
business of an insurer in the State of Utah.
(b)

Motor Cargo at all times material to TIE'S

Complaint maintained its principal place of business in North
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah.
(c)

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo

and the terms of an agreement between the parties dated
March 1, 1979, designated as -Retrospective Premium

2499J
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Determination Agreement ~

Plan III- (-Retro-Agreement—A"),

TIE issued its policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the
-Policy-) to Motor Cargo having an effective date of March 1,
1979.

A copy of Retro Agreement—A is attached hereto as

Exhibit -0-.
(d)

From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the

term of Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, the plaintiff
provided insurance coverage for Motor Cargo.
(e)

At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy

was renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on
March 1, 1982 and a second Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement—Plan III (-Retro Agreement—B*) was executed by the
parties.

A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached hereto as

Exhibit -P-.
(f)

One year later, on or about February 28,

1983, Motor Cargo gave the plaintiff written notice to cancel
all insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and
TIE, including the Policy.
(g)

In accordance with Motor Cargo's Notice of

Cancellation, TIE cancelled the Policy effective February 28,
1983.
(h)

A copy of the final "Retrospective Premium

Reports- dated September 30, 1985 is attached hereto as Exhibit
"Q-.
4.

Attorneys* Fees, if any are awarded by the Court,

may be proved in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of

2499j
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Practice of this Court, or in such other manner as the Court
may order.
Dated this /&?

.
day of December, 1987.
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendant

RETROSPECTIVE
PREMIUM
DETERMINATION
AGREEMENT

TRUCK
INSURANCE
EXCHANGE

A
PLANM

V
Mutt*** mtuKAmc* mmw$p

WHEREAS the T R U C K INSURANCE EXCHANGE, hereinafter called the ' E x e h o n a V hat issued o certoin
policy of insurance to

Motor Cargo
hereinafter called the 'insured" and
WHEREAS the Exchonge and the Insured desire to determine ond adjust the earned premium upon such
policy as herein provided,
NOW, T H E R E F O R E , in consideration of the payment of the premium provided for in said policy ond the
mutual acceptance of the terms set forth herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.

P E R I O D OF A G R E E M E N T . This agreement shod take effect

******

1 ,

1112

ond shall terminate
MirCh 1 ,
I t t S
of 12:01 A . M . Stondord Time at the principal office of the Insured as of each of said dotes, unless
terminated eoriier by the cancellation of said policy or as provided hereinafter in this agreement,
2.

INSURANCE P O L I C Y . T h i s agreement shall apply t o p * l i r y o U 1 0 ^ 0 0 - 4 0

^ t k « t a m e d premium

on such policy shall be utilized in computing the earned premium under this agreement. The term
" P o l i c y " shall include ' p o l i c i e s ' when there are more than one subject to this agreement.
3 . A C C I D E N T R E P O R T S . The Insured ogrees to report to the Exchange as soon as procticoble a l l
accidents or losses insured under said policy.
4 . D E F I N I T I O N S . For the purpose of this agreement the words and phrases set forth below shall be
defined as follows:
(a) S T A N D A R D PREMIUM - The premium computed in accordance with the provisions of the policy,
other than this agreement.
(b) BASIC PREMIUM - f y n t y ^ t i T
of tr*t Standard Premium.
(c) R E T R O S P E C T I V E SURCHARGE

mnA

41/100

„p*r cent ( 7 € » 4 2 % )

tAftft-

-_

.per cent ( 1 0 • O O I )

of the Basic Premium.
(d) SERVICE FEE of the Basic Premium.
(e)

^

to/ioo

.percent 1 3 , S O ! )

P R E M I U M T A X E S - The amount of premium taxes required to be paid to any stateondother
governmental bodies on such portion of the premium earned on this policy that is subject to
adjustment by thie agreement.
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(f) R E T R O S P E C T I V E PREMIUM -

The earned premium according to this ogreement, computed a%

the sum of the Incurred Losses plus Service F e e , plus Premium T a x e s , in no event to exceed the
Standard Premium.
{g) I N C U R R E D LOSSES -

The sum of:

(1) Actual losses paid by the Exchange, including loss adjustment expense, and
(2) Reserves as estimated by the Exchange to liquidate unpaid losses and loss adjustment
expense on claims reported to the Exchange, and
(3) Reserves as estimated by the Exchange for orvpartmi

losses and loss adjustment expense.

(h) R E T R O S P E C T I V E R E T E N T I O N - For purposes of premium determination in accordance with
this agreement, the aggregate of actual paid losses and reserves for unpaid losses arising out
of any single occurrence or accident chargeable to "Incurred Losses* shall not exceed
I lQrQQQ
which sum shall be defined as the "Retrospective Retention". No Adjustment
Expense shall be included in determining the amount of any loss for purposes of the Retro*
spective Retention.
(i) ADJUSTMENT E X P E N S E - There will be two types of loss adjustment expense,which shall
be defined and computed as follows.
(1) Allocated Adjustment Expense -

Exact items of expense directly incurred by the Exchange

and chargeable to a particular claim. (Examples: Legal fees, court costs, medical examiner's
fees, photographer b i l l s , independent adjusters, etc.)
(2) Unallocated Adjustment Expense - A charge to cover all general claims administration costs.
(Examples: Services of salaried adjusters, claims examiners, clerical service, stationery,
office rent, and other overhead items). The charge to h»
Liability claims and
5. D I S T R I B U T I O N

0

OF ADJUSTMENT

17

% of all paid Bodily Injury

% of all other paid claims.
E X P E N S E . A l l Adjustment Expense shall be chargeable

to

incurred Losses, except that, if the amount of loss from any single occurrence or accident exceeds the
amount of the Retrospective Retention,
(o) Allocated Adjustment Expense shall be charged to Incurred Losses in the same proportion that
the Retrospective Retention bears to the total amount of the loss; and
(b) No Unallocated Adjustment Expense shall be charged on that portion of any such loss in excess
of the Retrospective Retention.
6.

PREMIUM P A Y M E N T . Premium for the policy subject to this agreement shall be paid in monthly
installments and, initially, at the Basic rate. Once each month following the first thirty-day period of
this agreement a ratio shall be calculated between Incurred Losses, as defined herein, and the
premium charged, less premium refunds. As long as the loss ratio so calculated remains ot 7 f t °Z>
or less, premium shall continue to be paid at the Basic rate.

7. C O L L E C T I O N OF R E T R O S P E C T I V E SURCHARGE. At any such monthly calculation if the loss
ratio so derived shall exceed _ J U f e , the Insured shall pay upon demand the difference between premium
paid for the preceding period or periods and an amount sufficient to bring the loss ratio t o .
not to exceed the Standard Premium for the period this agreement has been in farce; and shall pay
premium for succeeding monthly periods at the Standard rote, but only as long as the loss ratio exceeds J t i _ % .

POAffl
*•*!»*•
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8. SUSPENSION OF RETROSPECTIVE SURCHARGE. If, «t ony monthly calculation, the loss ratio
. aholt fafl below_JJL3# *** B°** c rate'shall be reinstated and the preceding provisions shall
apply ae frees the beginning. Any suspension of collection shall not constitute o woiver of the
right to collect the Retrospective Surcharge so suspended; but the suspension shall act only o%
a postponement of billing until such time as the Surcharge may be required.
9. INTERIM ACCOUNTING. The Exchange shall moke a preliminary accounting to the Insured as of
the end of the 12-month and 24-month periods of this agreement and at these times, if the Retroelective Premium is lets than the total premium paid, the Exchange shall credit up to f f
pereent of the difference to the account of the Insured or will refund up to^JUL-percent of such difference at these tieies to the Insured; at such t i e * and in the manner requested.
10. MINIMUM PREMIUM. The minimum earned premium for the period of this agreement sholl not be less
than the Service Fee plus Premium Taxes.
11. MAXIMUM PREMIUM. The maximum earned premium for the period of this agreement shall not exceed
the Standard Premium.
12. COMPUTATION OF PREMIUM. The Retrospective Premium shall be computed as follows:
(a) As of sixty days after the termination of the agreement the Exchange shall moke the initial
computation of the earned premium.
Cb) At intervals of six storrths, twelve months, twentyfour months and thirty-six months after the
termination of the agreement the Exchange shall recompute the Retrospective Premium on the
basts of the Exchange's determination of the amount of Incurred Losses.
(c) The Retrospective Premium determined by the fifth recomputotion sholl be the final earned
prmmium for the policy.
(d) Final computation may be mode at any date prior or subsequent to thirty-six months after termination of the agreement, by written ogreement between the insured and Exchange.
13. ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the Retrospective Premium at the 60-day, 6-month,
12-month, 24-month, and 36-morrrh periods, ond provided the Retrospective Premium for the term
of this ogreement is less than all premium paid to the Exchange upon said policy, the Exchange
shall, after each such computation, credit the excess premium paid to subsequent policies issued
to or subsequent premium determination agreement entered into with the Insured, or refund such
excess premium to the Insured at such time ond in the manner requested, provided any refund made
on the initial accounting shall be limited to not more than JUL—.oercent of the indicated excess
premium.
14. REIMBURSEMENT BY INSURED. Upon the making of any settlement prior to the finol settlement, if
the Retrospective Premium on subsequent premium determination is greater than the Retrospective
Premium developed on the last settlement date, the insured will pay to the Exchange, upon demand,
the amount of the difference between the newry developed Retrospective Premium ond the Retrospective Premium developed on the last settlement date.
15. PREMIUM COLLECTION. The named insured agrees to pay all reasonable collect, on costs, including reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, incurred in collecting ony premiums or other
sums due the Exchange under this ogreement.

16* CANCELLATION. This ogreemertt may be cancelled by the Insured, or by the Exchange, at any time,
by giving tfeirty days 0 0 ) advance written notice to the other party. The Exchange may cancel the
agreement because of non-payment of premium by giving ten days (10) advance written notice to the
Ineured. The prmmwm for a -cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agre^mmnt sholl be
computed in accordance with the other provisions of this agreement, subject to the following
additional provisions.
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured*
in ^>feni of cancellation by the named insured for any other reason, the minimum earned premium
shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but the amount
so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as defined in this agreement, provided,
however, that if tne insured order• cancellation of this agreement within sixty days following
the effective data of any rate increase in any of the policies of insurance applicable to this
agreement, or the business entity is dissolved, the earned premium shall be the Retrospective
Premium.
(b) Cancellation by the Exchange:
In the event of cancellation by the Exchange, the earned premium shall be the Retrospective
Premium. A cancellation for non-payment of premium shall be considered to be a cancellation
by the named insured, in which case the provisions of paragraph 16 (a), as stated above, shall
apply.
17. POLICY CONDITIONS. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to supersede, modify or amend
ony of the terms or conditions of the policies of insurance issued to the Insured and referred to
herein, except as respects the determination of the amount and method of premium payable as
orovided for tn this agreement.

Executed -

»«*i»*m11«%f

Tflmhft

Date

2-B-B2

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Truck Underwriters Asaociattol), Attorney • in -Fact

MGIOMAL MANAGE*
Accepted

PDA ]B
MMIM

1.77
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325
MARK F. BELL - 4536
LARSEN, MAZURAN AND VERHAAREN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
100 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, OT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3500

m
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF WENDELL WELLS

vs.
Civil No. 34602

MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Wendell Wells, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

All matters stated herein are based upon my personal

knowledge and information.
2.

I am personally acquainted with the account of the

defendant Motor Cargo (Motor Cargo) with the plaintiff Truck
Insurance Exchange (TIE) and negotiated the sale of insurance to
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Motor Cargo pursuant to the term of TIE'S Retrospective Premium
Determination Agreement ("Retro Agreement"), a copy of which is
attached to the plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit A and by
reference made a part hereof.
3.

At that time# I was the manager for TIE of its

national accounts and special lines.
4.

On behalf of TIE, I entered into preliminary

discussions with representatives of Motor Cargo regarding the
execution of the Retro Agreement.

I explained the contents of

the Retro Agreement to the defendant's representatives and in
particular hov; the cancellation provisions of the Retro Agreement
in Paragraph 16 would be applied.
5.

The name of one of Motor Cargo's representatives

with whom the preliminary discussions and negotiations were
entered into and to whom those explanations were made was
Lawrence J. Ranck, who indicated that he was Motor Cargo's vice
president.
6.

Before the Retro Agreement was executed by Motor

Cargo, I explained to Mr. Ranckf among other things, that the
retrospective rating was a method of determining, in retrospect,
what the final earned premium for a policy of title insurance
would be for the agreed three-year term of the policy, and that
all interim refunds and premium adjustments were subject to a

final adjustment and settlement at the end of the agreed threeyear term of the Retro Agreement*

I also explained to them that

if the agreements were terminated by Motor Cargo before the end
of the three-year terraf that the provisions of Paragraph 16 of
the Retro Agreement would apply and that the premium then due
would be the greater of the retrospective or basic premium computed under the terms of the policy plus a ten percent (10%)
short-range cancellation charge, and that Motor Cargo would lose
the benefits of retrospective rating.
7.

After I made the foregoing explanations and the

Retro Agreement was executed by Motor Cargo, a number of interim
refunds were made to Motor Cargo, the receipt of which was
acknowledged by Lawrence J.

Ranck, who further acknowledged the

refunds were subject to adjustments and final settlement on the
final settlement date.

Copies of those letters acknowledging the

interim nature of those refunds are attached hereto as "Exhibit
A", "Exhibit B", "Exhibit C", "Exhibit D", "Exhibit E", "Exhibit
F", "Exhibit G", "Exhibit H."

A letter signed by Hal R. Tate to

that same affect is also attached hereto as "Exhibit I."
DATED this / '').ci- day of September, 1986.

WENDELL TOLLS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

IJ - day of

September, 1986*

cmSM^^^^My Commission Expires:

J

V

'

Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this f/L-day of September,
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit
of Wendell Wells to Jay D. Gurmankin, attorney for defendant, 500
Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84101.

/• fe^/^/A-
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GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
Jay D. Gurmankin (#1275)
Christopher M. Mislow (#4189)
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM K. MAXWELL

vs.
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,
Civil No. 34602

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

WILLIAM K. MAXWELL, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am a full-time licensed insurance agent, and am

the owner of Mountain States Insurance in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

I began my insurance career with Transport Insurance, a

specialist in trucking insurance.

Since December 1984, I have

represented Farmers Insurance Group and its subsidiaries,
including Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE").

I am therefore not

only familiar with trucking insurance in general, but have
become particularly familiar with the retrospective premium
agreements issued by TIE, including both the agreements

FILMED
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themselves and the manner in which premiums are calculated
thereunder.
2.

In February 1983, at the request of Harold R.

Tate, the president of Motor Cargo, I reviewed in detail the
Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement executed by TIE
and Motor Cargo on March 1, 1982 ("Retro Agreement B"), a copy
of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit :t Paul J.
Semens.

Specifically, Mr. Tate asked me what penalties Motor

Cargo would be required to pay if it cancelled under paragraph
16(a) of the Agreement.
3.

It was my opinion that the only reasonable

interpretation of paragraph 16(a) of Retro Agreement B was that
Motor Cargo would have to pay 3 10% penalty of either the
retrospective premium or the basic premium, whichever was
greater, but that in no event would Motor Cargo forfei t its
rights to j> refund of excess premiums paid undei pat a graph 13
of the agreement.

I expressed this opinion to Mr. Tate.

It

remains my opinion that the paragraph is poorly worded and that
a layman reading its language would be easily confused as to
its meaning.
4.

I also showed Retro Agreement B to James

Keddington, an agent employed by Diversified Insurance Brokers,
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Following his review of the

agreement, he too expressed his opinion that Motor Cargo would
have to pay at most a 10% penalty under paragraph 16(a).
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5.

Following Motor Cargo's cancellation of Retro

Agreement B, TIE sent Motor Cargo an invoice (a copy of which
is attached as Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Paul J. Semons)
which did not reflect excess paid premium credits due to Motor
Cargo under paragraph 13 of the agteeir.ent.

At Mr. Tate's

request, I dratted a responsive letter dated September 15, 1933
for his signature, in which I pointed out to TIE that a premium
refund in the amount of $50,682.00 was owed to Mocoi Cargo.

(A

copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "E" to the Affidavit
of Paul J. Semons).
6.

TIE'S premium report dated September 30, 1935 (a

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") reveals that
Motor Cargo had paid a premium of $139,600.00, and that the
premium due was $32,669.00.

Hence, according to TIE'S records,

Motor Cargo is entitled to a premium refund of $56,931.00.
(This refund is greater than the amount claimed in the letter
which I drafted for Mr. Tate's signature because the reserves
mentioned at page 5 of the letter had been released, and part
of the released amounts were credited to Motor Cargo).
7.

It is my understanding from TIE'S report dated

September 30, 1985 (Exhibit M A M hereto) that the premium of
$82,669.00 shown thereon as owed to TIE includes the following
elements: (i) all of TIE'S out-of-pocket expenses, such as paid
losses and outside adjusting fees; (ii) all of TIE'S allocated
internal overhead expenses; and (iii) profit, which is built

into the 13.5% "service fee."

Consequently, the $56,931-00

which TIE is withholding from Motor Cargo is a sum in addition
to TIE'S expenses, in addition to TIE'S profits on the
agreement, and in addition to the 10% penalty under paragraph
15(a).
DATED this

jSm

day of July, 1986.

^M^^rfo

<i

Wi 11 i am K. Max%>e i 1

n

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before :ne this /^ ~"iay of
July, 1986.
My Commission Expires

^—--Ittftary Pubii
Residing at

24.63m
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INSURfl>-

MOTOR CARGO

5TATE_I5__DIST._&3___ AGENT.

3-1-8?
PERIOD OF PREMIUM OETERMINATION AGREEMENT: From
?-l-*2
Jo
RETRO. PLAN
III
RETRO. SURCHARGE
JJL
.% RETRO.RETENTION * 1 0 . Of
PLAN TJX LOSS R A T 1 0 _ _ J t 5 _ X (Incurred losses to Total Premium) REPORT AS OF:
SCPT 3 0 * 1 9 8 5
NOTE: AN Amounts Rounded TO THE Nearet* 0
1ASIC
SURCHARGE
TO

Pol.cy Nov > N 0 6 0 1 - 0 0 - 0 3
PREMIUMS
6120-00*40
Estimated Unpaid Premium
Paid Premium
A U D I T EARNED PREMIUM

126, (
13, i
139, i

126,036

13.56H

139,600

TOTALS
LOSSES INCURRED
PAIO tosses

20,000
32,976
-0-

Bodily Injury
All Other
Less Deductible Recoveries From Insured ( — )

52,976

toss ttsttves
i
i

III!

tOSStS INCUmCO SUT WOT HtfOtTtO

o o o c

Bodily Injury
All Other

i

-0-

i

Bodily Injury
All Other
AUOCATf D AOJUSTMtWT IXPtWSt

Bodily Iniury Paid
B. I. Reserve (15% of
All Other Paid

*

95
-0-

-0-

«*.166

«i,261

UNAUOCATED AOIUSTMIWT gXftNSt
Bodily Injury

Paid Losses*
Reserves
Incurred but not reportedL

20,000
-0-0-

20,000
X17

_%

3,*»00

\

2.618

AH O f h t

Paid Losses*
Reserves
Incurred but not reported.

32,976
-0-

32,976
X8

m U t t D«ftWibU l i M M f i t l

TOTAL LOSSES INCURRED
SERVICE PEE:

13.50

63,275
% of Basic Premium
TOTAL EARNED PREMIUM (Before Taxes)

TAX MULTIPLIER

1.0 2 3 5

_of Earned Premium

—

RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM

S

82„fif

RETURN PREMIUM ADJUSTMENTS

excess

^fi q

175,79?
g

187.7<t
JJlfL

LAST FIGURE IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN REPRESENTS RETURN PREMIUM ( + ) OR DEFICIT (—)
| (Subject to payment of estimated unpaid premium)

RFGIONAI MANACFt OR REGIONAL COMM. MANAGER'S COPY

HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325
MARK F. BELL - 4536
LARSEN, MAZURAN AND VERHAAREN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
100 3oston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3 500
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000O000

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM K. MAXWELL

vs.
Civil No. 34602

MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.

000O000

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss.
)

William K. Maxwell, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

All matters stated in this Supplemental Affidavit

are based upon my personal knowledge and information.
2.

On July 15, 1986, I signed an affidavit for use in

the above-captioned proceeding which was prepared by the attorneys for the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation.
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3.

This affidavit is filed to supplement my July 15,

1986, affidavit and to clarify certain statements contained in
that affidavit.
4.

I first became a licensed insurance agent on or

about June, 1982, and am currently the owner of Mountain States
Insurance in Salt Lake City, Utah, a company which was first
formed on or about October 25, 1984.
5.

Although I had seen the retrospective premium deter-

mination agreement of Truck Insurance Exchange (Retro Agreement) ,
the first time that I thoroughly reviewed and studied it was in
February, 1983, when at the request of Harold R. Tate, the president of Motor Cargo, I reviewed the Retro Agreement which had
been executed by Truck Insurance Exchange and Motor Cargo.

6.

At the time I reviewed and studied the Retro

Agreement in February, 1983, my then-employer, Transport
Insurance, was attempting to get the insurance business of Motor
Cargo that was then being handled by Truck Insurance Exchange.
7.

After Motor Cargo had transferred its insurance

business from Truck Insurance Exchange to Transport Insurance, I
agreed to draft a letter datd September 15, 1983, for the signature of Mr. Tate responding to the payment demand of Truck
Insurance Exchange.

A copy of that letter is attached hereto as

"Exhibit A."
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8.

At the time I wrote the letter and gave ray opinion

to Mr. Tatef I had had no experience in actually selling/ servicing or handling Retro Agreements, but I based my opinion in
that letter on my study and review of the Retro Agreement and
upon the opinion of James Keddington, who I believed had had some
experience in handling Retro Agreements.
9.

At the request of Motor Cargo, I acted on its behalf

in attempting to negotiate a settlement of Truck Insurance
Exchange's claim against Motor Cargo for the earned premiums
which Truck Insurance Exchange claimed Motor Cargo owed to it in
the Retro Agreement, and I have assisted Motor Cargo in formulating some of its answers to the Interrogatories served upon
Motor Cargo by Truck Insurance Exchange.
10.

As of the date of this affidavit, I have never sold

insurance coverage under the terms of a Retro Agreement.
11.

At the time I signed my affidavit on July 15, 1986,

I was and I continue to be an insurance agent for Motor Cargo,
handling much of its insurance business.
DATED this /7r?v day of September, 1986.

WILLIAM K. MAXWELL/'

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
September, 1986.

1 -f ^ day of

~- vU-yv-v--

Nofetry Public J
Residing at:

VXALC^U

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this Jj(

day of September,

1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Supplemental Affidavit of William K. Maxwell to Jay D. Gurmankin,
attorney for defendant, 500 Kearns Building, 136 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101.

l'W<M^<\
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